The Tenth Schedule, inserted by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment (1985), operationalises the anti-defection law to curb political instability caused by legislators switching allegiances for personal gain, directly affecting democratic accountability.
A legislator incurs disqualification if they voluntarily give up membership of their political party or vote/abstain contrary to party direction without prior permission. The latter ground, however, requires that the party has not condoned the act within fifteen days. This conditionality is critical and often overlooked.
The Supreme Court in Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India clarified that 'voluntarily giving up membership' need not mean formal resignation; conduct implying severance suffices. Critically, this act after election does attract disqualification — Statement II of the question is therefore incorrect as a blanket exemption.
The Speaker of the House acts as the Tribunal for disqualification petitions, a design that has drawn criticism for partisan adjudication. The Supreme Court in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu upheld the Schedule's validity while making Speaker's decisions subject to judicial review.
A merger of at least two-thirds of a party's legislative members with another party exempts those members from disqualification. No equivalent protection exists for individual dissenters, limiting space for principled legislative independence within the current framework.
The Tenth Schedule balances party cohesion against legislative autonomy, but institutional gaps — particularly in Speaker adjudication — demand structural reform, possibly vesting disqualification powers in an independent constitutional authority.
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