The Tenth Schedule, inserted by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment (1985), addresses the menace of political defection that destabilises governments and undermines electoral mandates, making legislative accountability a constitutional imperative.
A legislator incurs disqualification by voluntarily giving up party membership or by voting/abstaining contrary to party direction without prior permission. The law covers both elected and nominated members of Parliament and State Legislatures, including Rajya Sabha members, making Statement 1 and Statement 4 correct.
The original Schedule permitted a split when one-third of members separated; the 91st Constitutional Amendment (2003) abolished the split provision but retained the merger exception. A merger is valid only when at least two-thirds of the legislature party joins another party, making Statement 2 correct under current law.
Statement 3 is incorrect. In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992), the Supreme Court held that the Speaker's decision under the Tenth Schedule is subject to judicial review on grounds of mala fides, perversity, or violation of natural justice, though courts do not interfere at the interlocutory stage.
Vesting adjudicatory power in the Speaker — who is a member of the ruling party — creates an inherent conflict of interest. Several Law Commission and Parliamentary Committee reports have recommended transferring this power to an independent tribunal or the Election Commission to ensure impartiality.
The Tenth Schedule strengthens party discipline but its effectiveness depends on impartial adjudication. Reforming the disqualification authority remains essential to prevent the law from being weaponised by ruling majorities against legitimate dissent.
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