Article 108 of the Constitution provides a deadlock-resolution mechanism between the two Houses of Parliament, yet its scope is deliberately circumscribed to preserve the distinct constitutional roles of the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha.
A Joint Sitting can be convened when a Bill is rejected by the other House, when the Houses disagree on amendments, or when more than six months elapse without the other House passing the Bill. The President summons the Joint Sitting on the recommendation of the Cabinet, and the Speaker of Lok Sabha presides over it.
Money Bills are explicitly excluded from the Joint Sitting mechanism. Since a Money Bill can only be introduced in Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha's role is limited to making recommendations within fourteen days, no constitutional deadlock of the kind Article 108 addresses can arise. Referring a Money Bill to a Joint Sitting is therefore constitutionally impermissible — making Statement 3 the incorrect one.
The quorum for a Joint Sitting is one-tenth of the total membership of both Houses combined, consistent with the quorum rules applicable to each House individually. Decisions are taken by a simple majority of members present and voting, which structurally favours Lok Sabha given its larger numerical strength.
Joint Sittings have been convened only a handful of times since independence, underscoring their exceptional character. The mechanism balances bicameral deliberation with the need to prevent legislative paralysis on ordinary legislation.
Article 108 is a calibrated instrument — broad enough to resolve genuine inter-House deadlocks on ordinary Bills, yet deliberately insulated from financial legislation to preserve Lok Sabha's primacy in fiscal matters.
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